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Unfair Misuse: How Section 512 of the DMCA Allows Abuse of
the Copyright Fair Use Doctrine and How to Fix It
By Joel D. Matteson*
Hoping to spur the growth of the early Internet, Congress
passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998. The
goal was to balance online service providers’ interests in avoiding
secondary copyright liability based on their users’ online posts with
Internet users’ interests in maintaining their right to fair use of
copyrighted material online. Twenty years later, the evidence
demonstrates that the DMCA has skewed too far towards protecting
providers of online services at the expense of fair use. This has resulted
in unnecessary chilling of otherwise protected speech. Specifically,
under the DMCA, putative copyright holders may immediately force
down any content they deem to be infringing, regardless of fair use
considerations. To address this imbalance, Congress should amend §
512 to eliminate the automatic takedown period so that no material
comes down until the poster has had a reasonable opportunity to
present his or her fair use defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider an upcoming election. The public engages in vigorous
debate, online and off. Two weeks before the election, someone posts
snippets of a politician’s manifesto on YouTube to illustrate the
poster’s commentary. Upset, the politician issues a takedown notice
to YouTube under § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(hereinafter, “DMCA”), claiming the video violates his copyright.
The politician demands that YouTube immediately take the post
down. The candidate does not provide detailed justification, only selfserving and conclusory allegations. Even if both the candidate and the
poster suspect that a judge would likely find the video to be protected
under copyright’s well-established fair use doctrine,1 the candidate
does not actually need to worry about whether the posting constitutes
fair use – at least not for the next ten-to-fourteen days. This is because
under § 512(g) of the DMCA, the candidate enjoys unprecedented
power to require Online Service Providers (hereinafter “OSPs”) like
YouTube to take down the posted material automatically and upon
demand.2 Under the DMCA, the candidate may force the takedown of
posted material for at least ten-to-fourteen days, regardless of the
merits.3 Afraid of losing its safe harbor and of being sued for indirect
copyright infringement, YouTube takes the video down. In exchange,
YouTube gains immunity from secondary copyright infringement
liability.4 This is the DMCA bargain; putative copyright holders
suddenly become empowered to take down material they disapprove
based only on an assertion that it violates their copyright. For their
complicity, OSPs get legal immunity.
If the poster believes the material he or she posted constitutes
fair use, the poster may issue a counter notice under § 512(g)(3)
contesting the takedown. Unfortunately, by operation of DMCA law,
the video must nevertheless stay offline for ten-to-fourteen days
notwithstanding the counter notice.5 Ten-to-fourteen days later when
the mandatory takedown period expires, the material is finally eligible
1

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See also Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment,
24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 171, 176 (2010).
2
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(c) (2012). See also Letter from Lateef Mtima &
Steven D. Jamar, Institute for Intellectual Property & Social Justice, to Karyn Temple Clagg,
Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office 2 (Feb. 21, 2017) (Under the DMCA,
“rights holders continue to enjoy the unprecedented capability to have content summarily
removed from the Internet without judicial intervention or assessment of any kind.”) (available
at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-92475).
3
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(c).
4
§ 512(c).
5
§ 512(g)(2)(c).
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for reposting. But now the election is over. Reposting is moot.
Society’s right to engage in this valuable public discussion is forever
lost. The mandatory ten-to-fourteen day waiting has effectively given
the politician two weeks of free censorship.6
In 1998, Congress established the “safe harbor” of § 512 of the
DMCA.7 The safe harbor shields OSPs from secondary liability for
copyright infringement for posts made “at the direction of a user” of
an online service like YouTube, provided the OSP complies with
certain statutory requirements.8 If the OSP fails to qualify for safe
harbor protection, copyright infringement and liability are evaluated
under traditional copyright law. The DMCA makes it clear that failing
to qualify for a safe harbor does not limit any defenses a service
provider may have.9
The safe harbor benefits OSPs by shielding them from secondary
liability for copyright infringement. It also benefits copyright holders
by conferring upon them unprecedented power to force down all
content they allege to be infringing, regardless of whether it actually
infringes. The DMCA does not, however, adequately protect the
legitimate interests of posters of online content against the automatic
ten-to-fourteen day takedown power. This is because, under the
DMCA, posters of online content are denied basic due process and
protection for their non-infringing fair uses during this ten-to-fourteen
day period.
This article explains how the DMCA fails to sufficiently protect
users’ rights by infringing on fair use and, consequently, chilling the
academic, technical, commercial, political, and creative speech that
makes the Internet so valuable. This article proposes several muchneeded reforms to § 512, the core of which would be the removal of
the automatic ten-to-fourteen day takedown period. This period
results in an unnecessary prior restraint on fair use, without proof of
copyright or a hearing on fair use. Adopting the amendments in this
article will increase protection for fair use while continuing to protect
copyright and maintaining OSP immunity from secondary liability for
copyright infringement.
6

See Corynne McSherry & Kit Walsh, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment Letter on
Section 512 Study 16 (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/files/2016/04/01/eff_comments_512_study_4.1.2016.pdf.
7
See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (1998) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 512).
8
17 U.S.C. § 512. See also Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
9
§ 512(l). See also DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA): SAFE HARBORS FOR
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS, PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE NOTE 1-518-6907, Practical Law (last
visited on Aug. 27, 2018), https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-518-6907 (hereinafter
“Practice Note”).
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This article starts by describing the DMCA, including its key
provisions, legislative history, and policy. From there, the article
reviews specific examples of DMCA abuse and related chilling
effects, such as when putative copyright holders illegitimately use the
DMCA to muffle opposing political viewpoints or takedown wellmeaning videos that happen to include incidental use of copyrighted
works. This article then proposes much-needed reforms,
First, targets of DMCA takedown notices must have an
opportunity to respond before an OSP takes material down based
upon a DMCA notice.
Second, OSPs must leave the posted material up and available if
the user provides an affidavit of noninfringement.
Third, the definition of “repeat offender” should not include
users who provide counter notices unless subsequently adjudicated as
infringers.
Fourth, infringement complainants should be permitted to
remove the content violating the copyright only after the poster of the
content fails to remove the material themselves within a specified
time of the takedown notice.
Fifth, unless reviewed by a human, DMCA notices predicated
solely upon automatic, computer-generated infringement-detection
devices should be forbidden.
Finally, this article discusses the negative effect on free speech
that will persist until Congress reforms the DMCA.
I.

WHY CONGRESS CREATED THE DMCA

Throughout the 1990s, the Internet was rapidly becoming a
revolutionary new platform for the dissemination of ideas, speech,
information, and commerce. Along with this vast new information
platform came unprecedented challenges to protecting copyright
online. This was particularly challenging in view of the distributional
potential of the Internet coupled with copyright’s low bar to
creation.10 To enjoy copyright protection, one needs only an original
work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.11 No
formalities are required.12 In 1976, the United States made copyright
registration optional.13 In 1989 it removed the requirement notice.14 In

10

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (requiring only a
“modicum of creativity” to form a copyright).
11
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
12
Id.
13
§ 408.
14
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2583, 2587
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).
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1992, it removed the requirement to renew registration.15 Because a
copyright is so easy to create, and because the Internet allows mass
proliferation of content, anyone who uses the Internet frequently
encounters copyright and related allegations.16
Developed decades before the Internet, traditional copyright law
was ill-equipped to handle online piracy. Because it was difficult to
stop infringement at the individual level, the alternative under
traditional copyright law was to direct claims against OSPs under a
theory of secondary liability for providing the online venue.17
But holding OSPs responsible for the infringing acts of their
users would only slow the development of the Internet. Faced with
liability for their users’ infringing acts, OSPs would stop providing
services.18 Imposing on OSPs a “filter-everything” approach would
chill online services.19 Thus, the DMCA was organized around the
goal of “provid[ing] greater certainty to service providers concerning
their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of
their activities.”20 The law’s authors stated, “by limiting the liability
of [OSPs], the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will
continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the
Internet will continue to expand.”21 The legislative intent behind the
safe harbor was to facilitate “the robust development and world-wide
expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research,
development, and education.”22 Congress hoped that by limiting OSP
copyright infringement liability, the efficiency and utility of the
Internet would continue to improve and expand.23 Therefore, “without
clarification of their liability, service providers [would] hesitate to

15

Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 266 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a), 408 (2012)).
16
See Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1415, 1416 (2013).
17
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
18
See McSherry & Walsh, supra note 6, at 2.
19
See Elliot Harmon, “Notice-and-Stay-Down” Is Really Filter Everything, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-staydown-really-filter-everything.
20
S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998) at 20, 40 (The DMCA was intended to “protect qualifying service
providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory
infringement.”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105–796, at 72-73 (1998), 1998 U.S.S.C.A.N. 639, 649550; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105–796 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998).
21
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.
22
Id. at 1–2.
23
Id. at 8. (“It’s hard to overstate the importance of the DMCA’s safe harbor provision to the
growth of the early Internet. Had providers and platforms faced liability for what users
published, far fewer social networks and web hosts would have existed because of the legal risk.
Those that did exist would have had to carefully screen what users posted to ensure no copyright
violations were taking place.”). See also Klint Finley, The Internet’s Safe Harbor Just Got A
Little Less Safe, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/internetssafe-harbor-just-got-little-less-safe/.
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make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and
capacity of the Internet.”24
Any remaining OSPs would tend to censor material instead of
allowing the free and open discussion that makes the Internet so
valuable.25 Congress, therefore, needed a law that not only bolstered
copyright protection online, but also provided OSPs with immunity
against liability for secondary infringement.
As the DMCA was being debated in Washington, OSPs and
copyright holders lobbied intensely for more protection. Copyright
was safer, they argued, if the copyright claimant could, with the click
of a mouse, remove allegedly infringing content. Such concerns about
protecting copyright while not chilling the burgeoning Internet
overshadowed users’ legitimate interest in not being subject to prior
restraints and in being able to present the defenses of fair use and
uncopyrightable subject matter before their speech was silenced.
To serve this purpose, the law has historically recognized two
important boundaries around copyright. These boundaries were
developed over centuries to protect fair use and speech by limiting the
power of copyright.26 The first boundary, codified in § 102(b) of the
Copyright Act, limits the scope of copyright to expression, not the
underlying idea.27 This idea/expression dichotomy holds: “In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principal, or discovery….”28 Implicit in the idea-expression
dichotomy is the recognition that monopolies on the mind, ideas, and
speech, while sometimes good for a few, are often bad for many.
The second boundary is copyright’s fair use doctrine.29 Under
the fair use doctrine, copying without permission is not an
infringement if it is for a limited, transformative purpose, including
24

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.
See Laura Sydell, Why Taylor Swift Is Asking Congress To Update Copyright Laws, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 8, 2016, 4:33 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/08/08/487291905/why-taylor-swift-isasking-congress-to-update-copyright-laws (“[I]f Congress made Internet companies responsible
for finding and taking down unauthorized music files, they would begin to err heavily on the
side of caution and censor musicians out of fear that their music might violate the copyright
laws and the company would be responsible for millions of dollars in fines.”).
26
See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – … the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market....”). See also Jon
M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and
Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1301 (2003) (“Anointing the author's relationship with his
work as essential and unrestricted stands in diametric opposition to the open marketplace of
ideas idealized in the United States.”).
27
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
28
Id.
29
E.g., Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1781, 1793 (2010).
25
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commentary, criticism, or parody.30 Fair use is essential to the
equitable, balanced, and proper administration of copyright law.31 The
fair use doctrine provides an important exception to the general rule
that only the holder of a copyrighted work may copy, distribute, make
derivative works, or publicly perform or display a copyrighted
work.32 The fair use doctrine is vital to U.S. copyright law.33 It
provides the necessary “breathing space” for expression and promotes
the dissemination of ideas and speech, which furthers copyright’s
ultimate purpose.34 It does this by expressly permitting the use of
copyrighted works by someone other than the rights holder to
disseminate ideas, critique, parody, criticism, education, and scientific
discourse.35
Taking away the defense of fair use by allowing for automatic
DMCA takedowns, even for ten-to-fourteen days, over-extends
copyright, chills speech, and prematurely, sometimes without cause,
deprives the public of a valuable exchange of ideas.36 Besides tearing
down important boundaries around copyright, the DMCA’s takedown
regime empowers censorship by shifting the burden of proof away
from the plaintiff and onto the accused.37 This is significant because
whoever bears the burden of proof wins the tie-breaker case.38 Not
only does it shift the burden of proof, the DMCA dramatically alters
the timing of the presentation of valid defenses to copyright
infringement until after the speech has been disabled. It transfers the
cost of responding or filing suit for declaratory relief onto the poster,
which can become an insurmountable burden for many.39
II.

WHAT CONGRESS CREATED: THE DMCA UP CLOSE

Concern about online copyright piracy culminated in Congress’
passage of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act in 1998, now known as § 512 of the DMCA.40
The DMCA takedown process works like this: a putative
copyright holder observes speech online that he or she wants taken
30

§ 107.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a “free speech
safeguard[]” and a “First Amendment accommodation[].”).
32
§ 107.
33
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 686
(2015).
34
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
35
§ 107.
36
See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004).
37
See Snow, supra note 29 (discussing the chilling effect on speech of placing the burden of
proof on the party claiming fair use).
38
See Loren, supra note 33, at 704.
39
See Seltzer, supra note 1, at 177.
40
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
31
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down. This complainant sends a written takedown notice to the OSP
that hosts the material (the OSP is required to list an agent for receipt
of such notices under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)). The accuser meets a
few simple statutory requirements, including that the accuser claims a
good faith belief that the target is infringing.41
After receiving the takedown notice, the OSP must either take
the material down for at least ten-to-fourteen days – regardless of
whether the material actually infringes on any copyright – or lose
immunity against secondary copyright liability.42 If the OSP values its
enterprise’s legal immunity over an individual poster’s free speech or
fair use, the material comes down.
However, § 512 was intended to create a system of checks and
balances to allow removal of infringing content while preserving
legitimate content.43 To that end, the DMCA system established four
separate safe harbors to protect eligible OSPs from liability for
copyright infringement based on actions by users of their services.44
The Transmission Safe Harbor covers services involving transmitted,
routed, or provided connections (for example, telephone lines) for
digital online connections for infringing material transmitted by
users.45 Material on a system or network where the material is initially
made available by someone else is subject to the Caching Safe
Harbor.46 The Storage Safe Harbor, which is the principal subject of
this article, involves material hosted, stored or made and “at the
direction of users.”47 Finally, the Search Engine or Information
Location Tools Safe Harbor concerns links or referrals of users to
online locations containing infringing matter or activity.48
The DMCA defines OSPs two ways. First, as “an entity offering
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user,
of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content
of the material as sent or received.”49 Second, the DMCA defines an
OSP as “a provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefor.”50
To be eligible for protection under the Safe Harbor, OSPs must
designate an agent for service of take-down notices.51 OSPs must
41

Id. § 512(c)(3); id.§ 512(g).
Id. § 512(g)(2)(c).
43
See Practice Note, supra note 9.
44
§ 512(a)-(d); Practice Note, supra note 9.
45
Id. § 512(a).
46
Id. § 512(b).
47
Id. § 512(c).
48
Id. § 512(d).
49
Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
50
Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
51
Id. § 512(c)(2) (“An agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement.”).
42
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provide agent contact information on both its websites and to the
Copyright Office.52 OSPs must write, adopt, and post online a repeat
infringer policy.53 OSPs must manage the take-down-notice process
and respond expeditiously to statutorily-compliant takedown
requests.54 OSPs must reasonably implement a repeat-infringer
policy. OSPs are ineligible for safe harbor protection if they benefit
financially from infringing posts for which they have direction and
control.55 Finally, OSPs must lack actual knowledge of infringement
or awareness of facts and circumstances (“red flags”) making
infringement apparent.56 What constitutes “knowledge” has been the
subject of much litigation. The general rule that has emerged is that,
to hold an OSP secondarily liable for infringing posts of its users,
general knowledge of possible infringement is not enough. Instead,
the OSP must have specific knowledge of particular instances of
infringing activity.57 As long as the OSP lacks such specific
knowledge, it may avail itself of the DMCA safe harbor.58
In drafting the safe harbor, Congress was careful to alleviate
OSPs from having to monitor their websites for potentially infringing
activity. Under § 512(m)(1), an OSP has no affirmative duty to
monitor for or seek out possible infringements to be eligible for safe
harbors.59 In Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, for example, the court
observed, “Were we to require service providers to terminate users
under circumstances other than those specified in § 512(c), § 512(c)’s
grant of immunity would be meaningless,” as service providers would
then need to assume the additional burden of removing users, which
the DMCA was designed to ameliorate.60
Throughout Congress’ deliberations, protecting OSPs and
copyright was the overriding agenda. Users’ interests in fair use were
overshadowed by comparison. This is reflected in the fact that users’
only recourse under the DMCA is to file a “counter notice.” This
right, however, is very limited and ultimately ineffective because it
occurs only after posted material is disabled and removed. It does
nothing to prevent the core problem of automatic takedown of
material for ten-to-fourteen days. Under the DMCA, if a user
provides a counter notice, the OSP may decide whether to re-post the
52

Id.
Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
54
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
55
Id. § 512(c).
56
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
57
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013).
58
Id. at 1021.
59
§ 512(m)(1).
60
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007); see also H.R. REP. NO.
105–551, pt. 2, 61 (1998) (“Section 512(i) is not intended “to undermine the ... knowledge
standard of [§ 512](c).”).
53
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material, but nothing in the statute requires reposting. In fact, OSPs
often lack incentives to repost. Even if an OSP wants to repost, it
cannot do so less than ten days after receiving a counter notice
without losing immunity under the safe harbor.
Making matters worse, under the DMCA, users are not entitled
to notice of the ex parte takedown until after it occurs.61 Thus, users
are not entitled to present either a fair use defense or the defense of
uncopyrightable subject matter or thin copyright before the material
comes down. This is because Congress failed to extend the fair use
and uncopyrightable subject matter defenses to the critical ten-tofourteen-day automatic DMCA takedown regime. Without these
protections, too many OSPs have abused the DMCA takedown power
and too much legitimate speech has been removed.
III.

THE PROBLEM: WIDESPREAD DMCA ABUSES

In 2007, Stephanie Lenz, a stay-at-home mother, uploaded a
brief video on YouTube of her dancing toddler. For less than thirtyseconds, Prince’s song, “Let’s Go Crazy,” played audibly in the
background. Although there was no hint of commercial use or
infringement – Stephanie was simply sharing with friends and
followers – Universal Musical Corporation, Prince’s publishing
administrator responsible for enforcing his copyrights, issued a
takedown notice. YouTube summarily removed the video. Stephanie
filed a counter notice under § 512(g) before filing for declaratory
relief in federal district court. Stephanie sought relief under § 512(f)
for knowing misrepresentation of allegations of infringement under
the DMCA. Ruling in Stephanie’s favor, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California held that Stephanie’s
video was fair use.62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, declaring that “Fair
use is not just excused by the law, it is wholly authorized by the
law.”63 The Ninth Circuit declared that putative copyright holders
have a “duty to consider – in good faith and prior to sending a
takedown notification – whether allegedly infringing material
constitutes fair use.”64
While the Lenz decision sounds encouraging, the decision is
difficult to enforce because the user must somehow prove bad faith or
willful blindness on the part of the DMCA complainant.65 This is
unworkable for people like Stephanie. By the court’s own admission,
the Lenz standard sets a low bar for plaintiffs to overcome with
61

§ 512(g)(2)(A).
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1151.
64
Id. at 1157.
65
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v); id. § 512(f).
62
63

2018]

UNFAIR MISUSE

11

respect to establishing their subjective good faith:
“Though Lenz argues Universal should have known the video
qualifies for fair use as a matter of law, we have already decided a
copyright holder need only form a subjective good faith belief that a
use is not authorized.”66 The copyright holder is the party forming the
subjective intent; therefore, that party is in a privileged position to
declare whether or not that subjective state of mind has been met. The
Lenz court continued: “If, however, a copyright holder forms a
subjective good faith belief the allegedly infringing material does not
constitute fair use, we are in no position to dispute the copyright
holder’s belief even if we would have reached the opposite
conclusion.”67 If the court cannot dispute the copyright claimant’s
subjective mental state, are targets such as Stephanie any better off?
Moreover, in a recent Federal Case in New York, the court
rejected a DMCA target’s § 512(f) misrepresentation claim, holding
that the copyright holder did have a good faith subjective belief.68 The
court ruled that once the putative copyright holder alleges good faith,
the onus is on the target to disprove that mental state.69 There, the
target “failed to proffer any evidence that suggests defendants lacked
a subjective ‘good faith belief,’ and therefore . . . failed to create a
triable issue.”70
It is not clear whether other courts will adopt the Lenz approach
and require – at least in theory – that the copyright holder consider
fair use or, alternately, whether courts will follow the precedent in
Hosseinzadeh and require the target somehow prove the
complainant’s bad faith.
At least one court has refused to apply the Lenz rule altogether.
In Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, the US District Court for the District
of Massachusetts declined to follow the earlier district court decision
in Lenz, which held that a copyright holder must consider fair use,
holding, on the contrary, that “the DMCA did not require a noticegiver verify that he or she has explored an alleged infringer’s possible
affirmative defenses prior to acting….”71 The risk of other courts not
following Lenz is legitimate considering that Congress, in enacting
the DMCA, did not require a sender of a takedown notice to verify

66

Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1153 (citing Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th
Cir.2004)); see also § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
67
Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1154.
68
Hosseinzadeh v. Klein, 276 F. Supp. 3d 34, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
69
Id. at 47.
70
Id.
71
Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 961 F.Supp.2d 333, 343-44 (D. Mass. 2013).
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the existence or lack of fair use, only to affirm a good faith belief that
the copyrighted material is being used without permission.72
Thus, even though § 512(f) – in theory – renders a copyright
claimant liable for damages for bad faith allegations, all that the
DMCA requires to avoid such liability is to produce a mere selfserving allegation of good faith under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). For the
target of a DMCA takedown, holding the putative copyright holder to
a bad-faith standard is too difficult because it requires proving a
subjective mental state.
In another high-profile instance of DMCA abuse, just weeks
before the 2008 election, several political advertisements from the
McCain campaign were abruptly taken down due to a DMCA notice.
This notice was perpetrated by various news and television companies
alleging the ads infringed their copyrighted television programs.73
The McCain campaign responded to YouTube in vain:
We write … to alert you to a problem that has already
chilled this free and uninhibited discourse ….
[O]verreaching copyright claims have resulted in the
removal of non-infringing campaign videos from
YouTube, thus silencing political speech …. [O]ur
advertisements or web videos have been the subject of
[Digital Millennium Copyright Act] takedown notices
regarding uses that are clearly privileged under the fair
use doctrine. The uses at issue have been the inclusion of
fewer than ten seconds of footage from news broadcasts
in campaign ads or videos, as a basis for commentary on
the issues presented in the news reports, or on the reports
themselves.74
YouTube responded by pointing out that the DCMA tied its
hands. If it wanted to maintain its immunity, YouTube explained, it
had to take the material down for at least ten-to-fourteen days,
regardless of the merits.75
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The Obama campaign suffered a similar indignity.76 In that
instance, the rightsholder, NBC, insisted that the Obama campaign
cease distributing an advertisement titled, “Bad News,” that dissuaded
voting for McCain. NBC reasoned that it had not been consulted and
the video briefly showed images of reporter, Tom Brokaw, then in the
employ of NBC.77
News organizations repeatedly misuse the DMCA takedown
process to target political ads containing fair use material, such as
brief media clips. For instance, BMG Rights Management issued a
takedown notice targeting an official Romney campaign ad that
showed President Obama singing a line from Al Green’s song, “Let’s
Stay Together.”78 The political clip was not about commercializing Al
Green’s song. Its purpose was purely political, but it came down
anyway because, under the DMCA, the underlying merits are
irrelevant during the ten-to-fourteen day automatic takedown period.
In another widely publicized instance of DMCA abuse, radio
host Rush Limbaugh sent a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube
demanding removal of a montage of Limbaugh’s “most vile
smears.”79 The footage was arguably embarrassing to Limbaugh and
the DMCA provided the means to disable access to the material.
Artist Johnathan McIntosh made a transformative remix video, Buffy
v. Edward: Twilight Remixed.80 The clearly transformative video did
not, however, stop Lionsgate from issuing a takedown notice. Facing
public outcry, Lionsgate relented, but not before much disruption and
waste.81 Public outrage forced Lionsgate to back off, but many
takedowns take place in the “shadows of the law” where they are not
subject to public censure.82
Film critic, Kevin B. Lee, had his entire YouTube account
suspended due to DMCA takedown notices. Why? Because Lee used
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brief clips of films in his reviews.83 This was quintessential fair use.
Yet, nothing in the DMCA prevents any complainant from having a
post automatically taken down before the poster even receives notice
of the allegations.
Companies also misuse the DMCA to engage in “rent-seeking”
behavior where the DMCA takedown power becomes leverage to a
payoff arrangement.84
Complementing the anecdotal evidence, empirical studies also
confirm widespread DMCA abuse.85 One report described how
DMCA complaintants issued takedown notices to remove legitimate
political ads without considering fair use.86 This resulted in removal
and chilling of Constitutionally-protected political speech. One study
concluded that “[s]ervice providers have confirmed that unfounded
DMCA notices are common and significantly burdensome.”87
An empirical study of DMCA takedowns uncovers a
“surprisingly high incidence of flawed takedowns.”88 DMCA
takedown notices involving uncopyrightable subject matter and fair
use represented 30% of the takedown notices studied.89 Considering
the millions of takedown notices sent each year, the amount of lawful
speech implicated is staggering. With respect to the DMCA, the
speech at issue tends to be speech lawfully made under the fair use
doctrine since § 512 primarily affects copyright.
Yet, flawed DMCA takedowns are not subject to judicial review
and no allowance is made for fair use or uncopyrightable subject
matter, defenses that are fundamental to copyright law.90 Empirical
data shows that 57% of the takedown notices to Google are from
companies demanding the take down of material posted by
competitors.91 Over a third (37%) of the take down notices are from
83
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foreign companies.92 An Electronic Frontier Foundation study of the
DMCA concluded: “If even a small percentage of the millions of
takedown notices sent each year are improper, that percentage still
represents a significant swath of lawful speech.”93
IV.

THE SOLUTION—REFORMING THE DMCA

Experience demonstrates that the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown
regime actually creates two standards of intellectual property
protection: one for offline speech, where stronger due process
considerations require that copyright complainants support their
contentions with evidence before disabling speech, and another for
online speech, where prior restraints apply, and evidence is
inapposite.
The DMCA needs recalibration. As it stands, it wields a hatchet
where a scalpel is needed. It creates a bright-line rule that is
inappropriate for fair use, where, instead, a careful, nuanced, and
case-by-case approach is required.94 Recognizing this, the Supreme
Court observed, “The task [of fair use analysis] is not to be simplified
with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for case-by-case analysis.”95
To address these concerns, this article proposes five reforms.
First, users should be entitled to advanced notice of takedown
demands so they may respond before their speech is removed.96
Studies conclude that the counter-notification process is simply not
effective at addressing false and mistaken assertions of
infringement.97 For one, any counter notice is not effective for at least
ten-to-fourteen days, meaning an OSP could suppress content absent
justification or substantive inquiry for the term imposed by statute.98
This contradicts the longstanding disfavor of prior restraints. The
DMCA operates like a prior restraint because it imposes a limit on
speech, such as fair use, before any hearing on the merits. This allows
for private, extra-judicial disposition of speech in the “shadows of the
law.”99
Defenders of the DMCA status quo argue that users are afforded
due process via the limited counter notice provision, but users have
92
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no right to submit a counter notice before the material is taken down.
In fact, they don’t even have the right to know about the process until
after the material is removed. And even if the user has a legallyrecognizable defense, such as fair use, and timely submits a counter
notice, the posts are still automatically taken down for at least ten-tofourteen days.
Therefore, as the second method of reform, this article proposes
amending the DMCA to remove the automatic right to take down
disputed material on demand if the user providers a sworn affidavit of
non-infringement. Under the third reform posited in this article, if the
target does not respond, the material ultimately comes down. But the
burden of proof belongs back on the claimant instead of the accused.
Under a properly-reformed DMCA, an aggrieved copyright
complainant may still use the OSP to transmit a takedown demand,
but that complainant may not force the material down absent either an
agreement or a judicial order.
Contrast this with the current version of DMCA, where the
copyright complainant can force the material down simply by
providing a takedown notice wherein the alleged copyright holder
states that she has a good faith belief that there is no legal basis for
the use of the allegedly infringing materials.100 Giving the
complainant such broad power of prior restraint based on mere
allegation means protected speech is vulnerable to shutdown despite a
total lack of evidence of infringement and without regard to whether
the complainant even has a valid copyright.101 Instead, the material
should stay up if the poster makes a sworn statement that he or she
has a legal basis for posting the material. From there, the complainant
may still have her day in court, but she may not abuse the DMCA to
circumvent otherwise applicable law, such as the doctrine of fair use.
Abuse of posters’ rights, such as fair use, does not go away after
the automatic takedown period expires. The material remains down
because OSPs often lack incentive to repost the material: “If put-back
is not occurring in the appropriate circumstances, the process
becomes more akin to an extra-judicial injunction than a [temporary
restraining order (TRO)] – a dramatic realignment of traditional legal
procedures that protect defendants.”102 Without a pro-fair use default
rule, “[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden
(and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case
litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected activity (such
as posting fair use material online) – harming not only themselves but
society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace
100
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of ideas.”103 Consequently, “the censor’s determination may in
practice be final.”104
Moreover, a law such as the DMCA, making lawful activity
such as fair use posts subject to automatic takedown, tips toward selfcensorship. When too much burden is placed on the poster, selfcensorship results.105
This article also maintains that concerns about the removal of
the on-demand, ten-to-fourteen-day period are overstated. For
example, if a complainant issues a takedown notice to a blatant
infringer, such as one who reposts an entire copyrighted movie, that
infringer, caught red-handed, has little incentive to contest a costly
and losing case. Further, if that user does not respond with a good
faith affidavit of non-infringement, under the proposed reform, that
material may still be disabled. In other words, under the revisions this
article espouses, infringing material may come down, just not
immediately or automatically. In clear-cut infringement cases, the
material still comes down because obvious infringers are less likely to
file bad faith affidavits of non-infringement. If they do, and lose any
subsequent litigation, penalties may apply. Therefore, Congress
should adopt enhanced penalties to discourage frivolous affidavits of
non-infringement.
To limit abuse of the poster’s use of the affidavit of noninfringement, the DMCA should be amended to provide for punitive
damages to the copyright complainant who prevails in court despite
receiving an affidavit of non-infringement made in bad faith.
For the fourth proposed reform, the DMCA term “repeat
offender” should be redrafted to include only those who have been
adjudicated as copyright infringers more than once.106 This is
important because if an OSP deems someone to be a repeat infringer,
the OSP may ban that individual from using the online service to
engage in lawful expression, such as under the fair use doctrine. Thus,
such a ban should only take effect after a proceeding on the merits.
Studying the impact that repeat infringer provisions of §
512(a)(A) has on speech and fair use, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation finds serious Constitutional issues.107 Accusations of
alleged infringement carry drastic consequences: “A user could have
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content removed, or may have her access terminated entirely,”
without basis in fact or law.108
This paper further proposes that after receiving an affidavit of noninfringement from a user, OSPs must continue to be allowed to
maintain their safe harbor immunity, even if they do not take the
accused material down.
Fifth, no takedown should issue if based solely upon an
automatic, computer-generated infringement detection device unless
subsequently reviewed by a human. Under this reform, copyright
holders may still use automated infringement takedown devices, they
would just need someone to review the flag before issuing a DMCA
takedown notice. This is because when unverified automated process
generates DMCA notices, overbroad takedowns occur. A web crawler
constitutes such an automatic infringement detection device.
Copyright holders routinely use these devices to scour the Internet for
potential infringement. These devices’ primary benefit comes from
their ability to cover ground quickly. They are, however, rather poor
at evaluating images in context or weighing fair use or policy
arguments. For example, in one infamous case from 2003, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) sent a DMCA
notice to Penn State’s Department of Astronomy and Astrophysics.109
The RIAA accused the university of violating its copyright to songs
by the musician Usher. The RIAA’s automated detection device
mistakenly identified the musician Usher with Penn State’s faculty
member, Peter Usher, and his a cappella astronomy-themed song
about gamma rays.110 While web crawlers should continue to be
permissible, humans should review the results before basing any
DMCA takedown notice on them.
V.

DMCA AND FREE SPEECH

The DMCA raises concerns not only about copyright law and
fair use, but also about free speech. Under longstanding First
Amendment law, generally speech may not be silenced without a
hearing where evidence is presented and where the speaker enjoys
due process in terms of advance notice of an adversarial proceeding
and an opportunity to be heard during that hearing111.
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This is true offline, where the presumption favors speech, and
where prior restraints are, as a general matter, presumptively
unconstitutional.112 But online, under the DMCA, these rules no
longer apply. Online, a copyright complainant may remove posted
material (or “speech”) on demand, without proof or a hearing. The
speaker has no right to advance notice of any adversarial takedown
notice regarding online posts under the DMCA. Those who speak
online through an OSP cannot stop the takedown during the first tento-fourteen days based on any valid defense, such as fair use,
uncopyrightable subject matter, or thin copyright (where the
copyright is very narrow). Only after an OSP takes a post down due
to a DMCA takedown notice must it notify the user via an email
stating, “Your video has been removed due to a copyright
complaint.”113
DMCA abuse is particularly concerning in light of the centrality
of the Internet to modern-day discourse. Every important debate,
every major event, every new insight is expressed through the
Internet. Indeed, in drafting the DMCA, Congress observed that
“[t]he rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to Americans represent an extraordinary
advance in availability of educational and informational resources to
our citizens.”114 Laws regulating online posts, therefore, function as
laws permitting whether knowledge, information, and speech will
receive the same level of protection in cyberspace as offline. In Board
of Education v. Pico, for instance, the Supreme Court acknowledged
this, concluding that access to information “follows ineluctably from
the sender’s First Amendment right” and “is a necessary predicate to
the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press,
and political freedom.”115
The United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur noted,
“[B]y acting as a catalyst for individuals to exercise their right to
freedom of opinion and expression, the Internet also facilitates the
realization of a range of other human rights.”116 The issue of Internet
access and speech is, therefore, more broadly, an issue about human
rights – specifically, the right to information.
The Internet has become even more integral now than when
Congress created the DMCA in 1998. According to recent Pew
Research, two-thirds of Americans believe “that lacking a home
112
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[broadband Internet] subscription is a major disadvantage when it
comes to accessing government services, searching for employment,
following the news, learning new things, or getting health
information.”117 Therefore, deprivation of the right to fair use is
tantamount to deprivation of the Internet itself. Thus, “[d]epriving a
person of Internet access,” even if for only ten-to-fourteen days, is
“an extreme measure impacting fundamental freedoms of speech and
association.”118 With the benefit of twenty-years of hindsight, the
DMCA’s enablement of the private disregard of fair use, and the
removal of the plaintiff’s duty to prove the existence of a valid
copyright in the first place undermine the very policy behind
copyright itself – to promote the free and open exchange of ideas.119
Recognizing the vital public interest in free speech, the court in
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., for instance, held that, “while authors
are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the
ultimate primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access to
knowledge copyright seeks to advance …. ”120 Because copyright
exists for the public benefit, we must evaluate the DMCA based on
how well it furthers this ultimate purpose.121 The overbroad takedown
of lawful speech implicates the Constitution and the right to make,
seek, and receive ideas, information, and expression. This is why, in
Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the right to seek and
obtain information and speech is “fundamental to our free society.”122
Similarly, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union held that
expression on the Internet is entitled to the same First Amendment
protection as offline speech.123 Not only is Internet speech
constitutionally protected, but the Internet is central to disseminating
speech. Therefore, rules restricting Internet speech and fair use merit
closer scrutiny. The Reno court observed that the Internet is “the most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed.”124
At other times, the Supreme Court has declared similar values.
The right to receive information, whether on the Internet or not, relies
on the fundamental need to develop a person’s ability to exercise their
right to make meaningful and contributory expression in various
facets of society.125 Because there is no legally recognized right to
force private OSPs to post any particular content, a victim of an
117
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improper DMCA takedown cannot obtain a court order, such as a
temporary restraining order that compels the OSP to keep online
content subject to an abusive takedown demand.
Derogating these principles, the DMCA allows speech to be
forced down on demand for ten-to-fourteen days based on mere
allegation and without the claimant having to carry any burden of
proof or even having to establish the existence of a valid copyright in
the first place. The DMCA’s imbalance in favor of the putative
copyright holder “harm[s] the government’s interest in promoting the
generation and dissemination of knowledge and culture.”126
Ironically, the DMCA bias against users is self-defeating. By
depriving users of key protections against automatic takedowns, the
DMCA undermines the purpose for which it was created – ultimately,
to promote the dissemination of speech, ideas, and commerce by
encouraging the growth of a vital medium of communication, the
Internet. Instead, “[t]he law’s shield for service providers becomes,
paradoxically, a sword against the public, which depends upon these
providers as platforms for speech.”127 A “heckler’s veto” phenomena
emerges, where any putative copyright claimant who merely dislikes
a post can disable it arbitrarily via a DMCA takedown notice.128
In view of this widespread abuse, the DMCA should be amended
to give speech the benefit of the doubt. This would bring the DMCA
into compliance with centuries of American jurisprudence. “First
Amendment standards,” the Supreme Court reasons, “must give the
benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”129 On a
similar note, the Supreme Court, in Virginia v. Hicks, recognized that
failure to extend offline protections to online copyright infringement
allegations would inevitably harm society: “Many persons, rather than
undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of
vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose
simply to abstain from protected speech – harming not only
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”130 This is consistent with the High
Court’s previous observation that “the censor’s determination”
amounts to a one-sided and often self-serving appraisal of
infringement. This unilateral determination regarding whether
material stays up or goes down, the Court recognized, “may in
practice be final.”131
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Our legal system has long recognized the fundamental
procedural right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before
speech is muzzled, whether by a DMCA takedown or any other
means.132 Nowhere else in the law of the United States are such basic
procedural safeguards systematically eliminated. Offline, prior
restraints are heavily disfavored and have been for well over a
hundred years.133 Prior restraints are seldom appropriate absent a clear
showing of irreparable harm, which is rare in the copyright context,
where, for instance, money damages may be sufficient, such as from
an implied license or judicially-imposed reasonable royalty.134
Because takedowns occur when the issue of infringement is far
from clear-cut, the benefit of the doubt should go to speech. A prospeech default rule accords with long-standing policy in favor of
speech and against prior restraints.135 Such reform would give the
benefit of the doubt to fair use and squares with the legal policy of
erring on the side of protecting speech.136
CONCLUSION
To protect users’ interests in the indispensable defense of fair
use, Congress should amend § 512 of the DMCA to eliminate the
automatic and mandatory ten-to-fourteen-day takedown period if the
target responds with a good faith affidavit of non-infringement. If the
user does not respond, then the material should come down after a
specified amount of time. The simple adjustments posited in this
article will not harm copyright but will protect fair use while leaving
intact OSPs’ Safe Harbor immunity. In so doing, underlying policies
common to both the DMCA and copyright’s fair use doctrine – to
provide for the dissemination of ideas and speech – will be
strengthened for the public’s benefit.
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